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.IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
-------------------------------------------------------------
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
SANDRA J. TALBOT, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 18,340 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant was charged by information with manslaughter: in 
that on or about the 11th day of July, 1981, in violation of 
Section 76-5-205, Utah Criminal Code, as amended, the defendant 
did recklessly cause the death of Brandon Glen Talbot. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was tried by jury in the Fourth Judicial District 
Court of Utah County, the Honorable Allen B. Sorensen, Judge, 
presiding, on the 18th day of November, 1981. The jury found the 
defendant guilty as charged. Defendant was sentenced by the 
Court on February 26, 1982, to serve 1-15 years in the Utah State 
Prison. Notice of Appeal was filed on March 23, 1982. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant respectfully requests that the Court reverse the 
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verdict of guilty entered in the District Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following facts are those which were proved at trial 
with the use of the defendant's statement. On July 11, 1981, 
Brandon Talbot (deceased) , awoke from sleep at approximately 
10:30 a.m. Sandra Talbot, mother of the deceased stated that 
Brandon had been throwing temper tantrums for a period of several 
weeks prior to July 11, 1981, and this day was no exception. 
Therefore, when Brandon threw a tantrum Sandra put him back to 
bed. Brandon awake again at approximately 1:30 p.m. Sandra gave 
Brandon a piece of toast and put him on a kitchen chair. Again 
Brandon threw a temper tantrum, at which point Sandra hit the 
child twice in the head with her hand. The child fell forward 
and his head hit the table. The defendant, thereafter, began 
loving the child and telling the child that she would never hit 
him again. After the child was calm, the child was put back in 
the chair at the table. 
Sandra went over to the television and started to adjust 
it. She turned around and noticed Brandon choking. However, he 
soon stopped choking. Again she began adjusting the television 
and again Brandon started choking. When Sandra turned around the 
second time, the child was falling off the chair onto the floor. 
Sandra picked the child up and rushed next door to the neighbors, 
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Mr. and Mrs. Robert Scott. Sandra told the Scott's that Brandon 
was choking, and he was not breathing. She also told them that 
Brandon had fallen off the chair and had possibly hurt himself. 
The Scott's and Sandra took Brandon to the Utah Valley Hospital 
emergency entrance. Whereupon, Doctors Robert Gray, Brent 
Griffin and John Andrews attended to the child's medical needs 
until the child's death on July 13, 1981, at approximately 7:30 
a.m. 
During examination and treatment of the child prior to its 
death, pieces of toast were found lodged in its throat. An 
autopsy was performed on the body of the deceased by Dr. John 
Wallace Graham (State Medical Examiner) to determine the cause of 
death. The cause of death was attributed to bilateral subdural 
hematoma caused by a combination of several blows to the head. 
All doctors testified that the blows could have been accidental. 
Sandra Talbot was tried by a jury and was found guilty of 
manslaughter. Sentence was pronounced for one to fifteen years 
in the State Prison. 
The following facts were proved at trial without the use of 
the defendant's statement. Sandra rushed next door to the neigh-
bors, Mr. and Mrs. Robert Scott. Sandra told the Scotts that 
Brandon was choking, and he was not breathing. She also told 
them that Brandon had fallen off the chair and had possibly hurt 
himself. The Scotts and Sandra took Brandon to Utah Valley 
Hospital emergency entrance. Whereupon, Doctors Robert Gray, 
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Brent Griffin and John Andrews attended to the child's medical 
needs until the child's death on July 13, 1981, at approximately 
7:30 a.m. During examination and treatment of the child prior to 
its death, pieces of toast were found lodged in its throat. 
An autopsy was performed on the body of the deceased by Dr. 
John Wallace Graham (State Medical Examiner) to determine the 
cause of death. The cause of death was attributed to bilateral 
subdural hematoma caused by a combination of several blows to the 
head. All doctors testified that the blows could have been 
accidental. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE DID NOT PRESENT EVIDENCE OF THE CORPUS 
DELECTI OF MANSLAUGHTER AND THUS, THE INFORMATION 
CHARGING THE DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, 
AND THE DEFENDANT DISCHARGED. 
It is a fundamental principal of criminal law that an 
accused cannot be convicted of a crime unless the prosecution can 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the corpus delecti of the crime. 
In the instant case, the defendant was charged with manslaughter 
in that she recklessly caused the death of her son Brandon 
Talbot. In homocide cases such as this, the State must prove at 
least two facts to establish the corpus delecti. First the State 
must prove the fact of the child's death and secondly the State 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the child's death was 
-4-
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caused by means of criminal agency inflicted by the accused. 
Bennett v. State, 377 P.2d 634 (Wyo. 1963): State v. Thatcher, 
157 P.2d 258 (Utah, 1945)1 State v. Bassett, 495 P.2d 318 (Utah, 
1972). 
During the State's case, the State proved that the deceased, 
Brandon Talbot, died as a result of bilateral subdural hematoma, 
induced by several concussions on the brain. To establish this 
proof, the State called four medical doctors, the last of which 
was the medical examiner for the State of Utah, Dr. John Wallace 
Graham. The first doctor to testify was Dr. Robert Nelson Gray, 
a physician who worked in the emergency room at the Utah Valley 
Hospital (R. 87). Dr. Gray testified, over the objection of 
defense counsel, that he had been told by the defendant that the 
child (deceased) was sitting in a chair eating and fell from the 
chair, began to vomit and then quit breathing. When asked 
whether his examination of the child revealed the physical evi-
dence consistent with the defendant's statement, the doctor 
replied in the affirmative (R. 98). · Upon being further examined 
by both the Court and the prosecution, Dr. Gray testified that 
the injury to the child's head, which was a fresh injury, was 
consistent with the child falling from a chair and hitting a hard 
object (R. 94). 
The prosecution then called Dr. Brent Griffin, a pediatri-
cian, who testified that he treated the child until its death. He 
performed certain medical procedures in an attempt to restore the 
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child to a state of consciousness (R. 100-116) • On cross-
examination and on re-direct examination, Dr. Griffin testified 
that he could not rule out accident as the cause of the injury to 
the child's head and further stated that the child could fall 
against something and receive the injury that was discovered to 
be present on the child's head which in combination with other 
bruises to the head was diagnosed as the eventual cause of death. 
The State next called Dr. John M. Andrews, a neurologist, 
who testified regarding his examination of the child, Brandon 
Talbot, his diagnosis and conclusions regarding the injury and 
injuries found on the child's head (R. 120-134). On cross-
examination, Dr. Andrews, consistent with the previous doctors, 
testified that he could not rule out accident as a cause of in-
jury to the child's head (R. 136). 
Finally, Dr. John Wallace Graham, the Utah State medical 
examiner was called as a witness and testified of the cause of 
death of the child and then gave his testimony regarding the 
cause of injury. Dr. Graham testified that the cause of death 
was a head injury (R. 149). Dr. Graham identified a total of 
five bruises about the head area, one of which was a fresh 
bruise, the others of which were between five and seven days old 
as confirmed by testimony of the other doctors (R. 151). Dr. 
Graham further testified that the precise injury to the head 
which occurred within two to three days of the child's death, by 
itself, might not have caused the death of the child but that the 
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injury acting in combination with other injuries on the child's 
head would have caused the death of the child (R. 152-155). 
Consistent with the other doctors' testimony, Dr. Graham 
testified that the injury, which was determined to be the most 
recent of the injuries could have been caused by the child fall-
ing against a hard object by accident. Dr. Wallace Graham went 
on to give his opinion that a total of five injuries could not 
have been caused by accident, although he did not give any 
medical reasons or other logical explanation for his conclusion 
and opinion. 
Thus, the State at the conclusion of testimony of the 
doctors, and excluding any other testimony, proved only that the 
life of Brandon Talbot had ended due to injuries received to the 
head which injuries could have been the result of the child 
falling accidently against a hard object or a hard object 
accidently hitting the child's head. None of the doctors could 
rule out accident as a cause of injury, and the State Medical 
Examiner stated that the injuries to the head eventually caused 
his death. The only evidence of the defendant's involvement in 
the injuries, exclusive of her statement, was that the child had 
fallen from a chair, had hit the floor, began choking and 
vomiting and then quit breathing while it was in her custody and 
care. Thus, the State failed to prove a corpus delecti of the 
crime charged. That is, the State only proved that the death of 
the baby was caused by injuries to the head, any one of which 
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could have been caused by accident. The State did not prove that 
the injuries to the child were caused by a criminal means or 
criminal agency inflicted by the defendant, Sandra Talbot. 
In the case of State v. Bassett, 495 P.2d 318 (Utah 1972) 
the Utah State Supreme Court faced a fact situation very similar 
to the instant case. In Bassett, the defendants Weldon Bassett 
and Judy Bassett were found guilty of involuntary manslaughter. 
The facts disclosed that on the 8th day of November, 1970, Erica, 
the child of the defendants was taken to a hospital for treatment 
of an ailment manifested by convulsions and a mild fever. The 
family physician examined the baby, performed certain medical ex-
aminations and treatment and released the child. Thereafter, on 
the 24th day of November, 1970, the child was again taken to the 
hospital where she was pronounced dead. An autopsy was performed 
and it was found that the child had died from an acute and 
chronic subdural hematoma. The baby also had fractured ribs, but 
these did not contribute to her death. 
At the trial in the District Court, no evidence was produced 
by the prosecution which showed that either of the defendants 
committed any act or omission which resulted in the death of the 
baby. The Court submitted the case to the jury upon the theory 
that the defendants, being parents of the deceased child and 
being responsible for the child's protection, imposed upon them 
the duty of using ordinary reasonable care for the child's safe-
ty. The Court instructed the jury in effect that if the defen-
-8-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
dants were guilty of gross negligence in the care of the child in 
such a manner as to evidence willful disregard for consequences; 
and there being no circumstances amounting to a satisfactory ex-
cuse, and if fatal injury resulted from such lack of care, then 
such acts or ommisions were a sufficient basis to find the defen-
dants guilty. 
The Court reversed the conviction of the defendants and 
found as follows: 
The State had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the death of the child resulted proximately 
from some act or omission on the part of defendants. 
Even a showing of a mere thoughtless omission or slight 
deviation from the norm of prudent conduct is insufficient 
to support a finding of criminal negligence. In order to 
make out a case under the statute above referred to, it is 
incumbent upon the State to show an unlawful act or an 
infraction which is done in marked disregard for the safety 
of others. In this case, there being no evidence to show 
any act on the part of the defendants or either one of them, 
it was error for the Court to submit the case to the jury 
and to permit the jury to speculate upon the guilt or 
innocence of the defendants. The unfortunate death of the 
baby from injuries suffered by her from a source not shown 
by the evidence is insufficient on which to base a con-
viction. 
In the instant case, the State did not prove that the death 
of Brandon Talbot was caused by criminal agency or by any act or 
omission committed by the defendant. The State merely proved 
that the child had five bruises to the head, one of which had 
been inflicted within two to three days of its death and that the 
combination of bruises caused the death of the child. The 
State's witnesses further testified that any one or more of the 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
injuries to the head of the child could have been caused by 
accident. Thus, on its own, the State's evidence exclusive of 
any statement of the defendant was insufficient to establish the 
corpus delecti of the crime of manslaughter, and the Court, upon 
motion of defense counsel, should have dismissed the information. 
This Court has further stated that to constitute voluntary 
manslaughter, there must be an intent to kill or do great bodily 
harm, or do an act knowing the "natural and probable consequence 
thereof will be death or great bodily harm." State v. Gallegos, 
396 P.2d 414 (Utah, 1964). The State did not present evidence to 
show or prove that the defendant performed any act knowing the 
"natural or probable consequences" thereof would be death. In 
the case of People v. Strohm, 523 P.2d 973 (Colo., 1974), the 
Colorado Supreme Court stated that: 
The death could have been caused equally by accident or 
by a felonious act. In the view of this evidence, the 
inference of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt cannot be 
rationally drawn. 
In the instant case, the State's expert witnesses who testified 
concerning the cause of injuries and the cause of death all 
testified that the cause of injuries could have been by accident 
and that the cause of death was a result of the injuries. There 
was no testimony on the part of the expert witnesses indicating 
that the cause of the injuries or the death was by means of 
criminal agency. Thus, it is the contention of the defendant 
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that on the authority of the case of State v. Bassett and other 
cases cited herein, the information charging her with man-
slaughter should have been dismissed and she discharged. 
POINT II: 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE STATEMENT OF THE 
DEFENDANT SANDRA J. TALBOT. 
During the prosecution ·of its case, the State called Officer 
George Pierpont, a detective for the Provo police department who 
testified that he responded to a request to investigate the death 
of Brandon Talbot. Mr. Pierpont contacted the defendant Sandra 
Talbot and explained to her that he was a police officer and was 
investigating the death of her son. After his identification and 
his declaration of the miranda rights to the defendant, he 
interrogated her regarding her knowledge of the incidents leading 
up to the death of her child (R. 138-144; 157-162). When Mr. 
Pierpont was prepared to recite in open Court the content of the 
statement he had taken from the defendant, counsel for the defen-
dant objected, upon the ground that the statement was inadmis-
sable for the reason that the state had not proved the corpus 
delecti of the offense of manslaughter and that until a corpus 
delecti of the crime were established, the State could not use an 
incriminating statement of the defendant. 
At the outset of this brief, counsel took the liberty to 
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present two statements of facts, one including facts obtained 
from the statement of the defendant and the other one excluding 
those facts. It is quite obvious that a brief reading of 
counsel's two statements of facts together with the entire tran-
script of the record indicate that without the additional facts 
contained in the statement of the defendant, there would be 
absolutely no evidence of criminal agency involved in the causing 
of the injuries and eventual death of the child Brandon Talbot. 
Thus, it is easy to conclude that exclusive of the defendant's 
own statement, the State failed to prove a corpus delecti of the 
crime of manslaughter. 
It is fundamental and basic law in the State of Utah and 
other jurisdictions that a statement of an accused cannot be used 
against the accused to establish the corpus delecti of a crime 
and that said statement is excludable evidence until such time as 
the state independently establishes the corpus delecti of the 
offense charged. State v. Pineda, 519 P.2d 41 (Ariz., 1974); 
State v. Padilla, 474 P.2d 821 (Ariz., 1970); State v. Cooley, 
603 P.2d 800 (Utah, 1979) 
A reading of the transcript of the trial indicates that at 
best the State proved, exclusive of the statement of the defen-
dant that the child Brandon Talbot died as a result of injuries 
to its head, which injuries caused a subdural hematoma. All of 
the expert witnesses testified that the injuries could have been 
caused by accidental means. None of the experts gave testimony 
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based upon medical expertise that the child's injuries were 
caused by criminal means or criminal agency. However, with the 
addition of the defendant's testimony that she slapped the child 
twice causing the child's head to hit a table, the State was able 
to adduce evidence that the defendant perhaps acted recklessly 
and that her reckless actions under the criminal law caused her 
to become criminally culpable for the death of her child. It is 
defendant's contention that even adding her statement to the 
whole of the evidence, although defendant does not concede that 
it was admissable, does not give sufficient evidence to prove 
criminality in the cause of the injuries and eventual death of 
the child. That is, the striking of the child's head twice, 
causing the child to fall against a table and nothing more, seems 
wholey inadequate as evidence to persuade that the injuries were 
caused by criminal means. 
It should be noted that after the child's head struck the 
table, it was completely calmed down and restored to a point 
where it was eating toast which had been furnished by its mother. 
That it was after such occurrance that the child began to choke 
and because of choking apparently fell from the chair and struck 
its head once again. 
Defendant acknowledges that the jury has the right, if the 
evidence is appropriately before it, to consider all of the facts 
and evidence and make its determination of the verdict. However, 
the defendant does not believe that the jury should have been 
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permitted to hear and consider her statement inasmuch as the 
State had failed to prove the corpus delecti of the crime and 
therefore under the rules of evidence should have been precluded 
from introducing, and having admitted the statement given by the 
defendant to Officer George Pierpont. 
The defendant further contends that the Court erred in ad-
mitting the statement given by the defendant to George Pierpont 
and that such error was not harmless and was the essential in-
gredient upon which the jury relied to enter a verdict of guilty. 
Without her statement, the State's case would have failed. Thus, 
the Court committed reversable error and this defendant respect-
fully requests that this Court enter its order of reversal upon 
her second point aforesaid. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING DEFENSE COUNSEL'S MOTION FOR 
MISTRIAL. 
At the conclusion of the State's case, defense counsel made 
a motion to the Court to enter an order of mistrial of the case 
for the reason and upon the ground that the prosecutor in his 
opening statement and during the course of trial repeatedly used 
the words "death blow" and words of that kind in reference to the 
actions of the defendant. Counsel for the defendant maintained 
and argued that the use of such words was highly inflammatory and 
caused the jurors to form an attitude of prejudice against the 
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defendant, unduly and unfairly, and that such actions of the pro-
secutor should have resulted in a mistrial of the case. 
In the case of People v. Purvis, 384 P.2d 424 (Cal., 1963) 
the California Court held that: 
It has consistently been held that the official position 
of the district attorney, as representative of the people, 
carries such weight with the jury that his statements of 
fact predicated on his knowledge, rather than on the 
evidence, constitutes reversable error. 
In the case of People v. Lyons, 303 P.2d 329 (Cal., 1956), 
the Court stated that where the evidence in a case is closely 
balanced and the guilt of the defendant has not been established, 
the prosecution's misconduct may turn the scales against the de-
fendant thus resulting in grounds for reversal or mistrial. The 
court further intimated that it is as much the prosecutor's duty 
to refrain from improper methods to produce a wrongful conviction 
as it is to bring about a just one. 
A particular statement made by the prosecutor in the closing 
paragraphs of his opening statement seems to be particularly 
inflammatory and calculated to excite the jury unduly and unfair-
ly against the defendant at the outset of the trial. The state-
ment is as follows: 
Now the charge today is a serious charge. Its manslaughter. 
Manslaughter is always a very serious charge, because it 
means that someone is dead. Nothing we do here today can 
bring that person back to life. This particular case, the 
facts are particularly tragic, because the person who is 
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dead, his life was so short. His name was Brandon Glen 
Talbot. He died when he was eighteen months old. Just a 
child. Not much more than a baby with a very small 
vocabulary. The tragedy of this case lies, not only in 
the fact that the child was so young, but that the dea·th 
blow was delivered by the child's mother, the defendant 
in this particular case. 
The prosecutor, after being admonished by the Court off the 
record, used the words "death blow" a second time in the remain-
der of his opening statement. The prosecutor's opening statement 
is in the record at pages 79 through 80. Counsel for the defen-
dant reserved his right to make additional arguments for mistrial 
at the close of State's case. Upon the close of State's case, 
the defendant's counsel did move the Court for a mistrial of the 
case upon the ground and for the reason that the prosecutor's 
statements and use of the words "death blows" were inflammatory 
and prejudicial (R. 176). It is the defendant's position that 
the conduct of the prosecutor in his opening statement created 
sufficient prejudice against the defendant that the defendant had 
grounds for mistrial of the case. This is true particularly in 
light of the fact that the prosecutor was not able to prove in 
his case that the defendant did inflict "death blows" on the 
child Brandon Talbot. 
CONCLUSION 
The corpus delecti of a case must be proven by the prosecu-
tion beyond a reasonable doubt. The corpus delecti of 
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slaughter includes proof of the death of the victim as well as 
proof that the death was caused by criminal agency inflicted by 
the accused. In this case, the prosecution did not present 
evidence which would lead a reasonable mind to conclude beyond a 
reasonable doubt that criminal agency was the vehicle in causing 
the injuries and eventual death of Brandon Talbot. 
The Court admitted the statement of the defendant Sandra J. 
Talbot over the objection of counsel, which statement should have 
been excluded from the evidence until such time as the prosecu-
tion had introduced evidence supporting the corpus delecti of 
the offense of manslaughter. As previously contended, the State 
failed to present evidence giving rise to the corpus delecti of 
the crime of manslaughter and therefore it was error for the 
Court to allow the statement of Sandra J. Talbot, the defendant 
to be admitted as evidence. 
Finally, the prosecutor, in his eagerness to obtain the con-
viction of the defendant in this case used inflammatory and pre-
judicial statements in his opening argument which incited a 
prejudice in the minds of the jury against the defendant unduly 
and unfairly and which should have resulted in a mistrial of the 
case. 
Respectfully submitted this )f.:f:!::aay of October, 1982. 
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN 
-17-
T 
Defendant-Appellant 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing 
brief of appellant to the Utah Attorney General, DAVID L. 
WILJJNSON, at 236 State Capitol, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111 this 
~day of October, 1982. 
.-18-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
